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Discourse and descriptive
business ethics
Gjalt deGraafn
Watson (2003: 168) claims that ‘although increas-
ing academic attention is being paid to business
ethics, the ways in which ethical consideration
come into activities and decisions of organiza-
tional managers have been examined in a very
limited way’. This article contributes by suggest-
ing an interesting way to study moral managerial
decisions is studying these decisions in their
discursive context. This paper examiners why
and how discourse analysis can aid descriptive
business ethics.
In this article, ﬁrst it will be claimed that the
internal dynamics within organizations render
methodological individualism in business ethics
hard to defend. Therefore, describing the moral
side of a company by describing the moral part of
managerial decision-making provides just a frag-
ment of the whole picture. Somehow, the business
context wherein managerial decisions are made
also contains important moral information.
Causalities that transcend individuals are pro-
posed as a unit of analysis in empirical moral
research, namely discourse. It is suggested that an
interesting method for describing (moral) deci-
sions of managers is looking at the way managers
talk about their reality. After describing what is
meant by discourse in this article, it is suggested
how discourse analysis could be used in descrip-
tive business ethics. Special attention will be paid
to genealogical discourse analyses, and to the
study of storylines and metaphors to reveal moral
sides of managerial decision-making.
Studying (moral) managerial decisions
Before discussing the moral description of man-
agerial decisions, ﬁrst it should be explained what
is meant by ‘descriptive ethics’. Descriptive ethics
is about the factual description and explanation of
moral behaviour. It is therefore a non-normative
approach in ethics; it tries to describe without
taking a moral position.1 This contrasts with
normative approaches like applied ethics: pre-
scriptive ethics. A warning from Beauchamp
(1991: 34) is warranted however: ‘It would be a
mistake to regard these categories as expressing
mutually exclusive approaches’. It will be made
clear that the normative and non-normative
approaches can never be purely distinguished.
The distinction, however, is useful for a better
understanding of the different areas of business
ethics.
Descriptive ethics in current business ethics is
often centered on concepts like choice and the
moment of decision-making (Parker 1998). The
decision is to some the end-point of business
ethics, because it is, as Parker (1998: 291) writes,
the moment where judgments are translated into
some kind of practice. That is the point where
ethics can determine behaviour. Many scholars
who believe strongly in using one of the classic
moral theories within business ethics (see Soule
2002: 114/115, for several important contribu-
tions),2 focus on managers and how they should
make individual choices. Implicitly it is assumed
that the conscious decisions of managers deter-
mine what actions organizations undertake. So-
ciety and human behaviour are viewed as the
outcomes of conscious (moral) decisions; the
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functioning of organizations is seen as the out-
come of (conscious) managerial decisions. Thus, if
managers get good moral advice (and abide by it),
the organization will behave in a good moral
sense. This is why the part of business ethics that
leans heavily on classic philosophical ethical
theories has clear afﬁnities with choice-based
decision theories. As March (1997: 10) writes:
The study of how decisions happen provides a
setting for a cluster of contested issues about
human action. The ﬁrst issue is whether decisions
are to be viewed as choice-based or rule-based. Do
the decision-makers pursue the logic of conse-
quence, making choices among alternatives by
evaluating their consequences in terms of prior
preferences? Or do they pursue a logic of appro-
priateness, fulﬁlling identities or roles by recogniz-
ing situations and following rules that match
appropriate behavior to the situations they en-
counter?
Even though the durability of the choice-based
view in the literature is impressive, there is – and
always has been – much critique, especially from
rule-based theorists, who generally deny the
principles of choice-based theorists. They argue
that the logic behind decision-making processes is
fundamentally different. Rather than rational,
anticipatory, calculated, consequential action,
they argue that decision-making is the result of
a logic of appropriateness, obligation, duty and
rules, whereby decision-makers can go against
their conscious preferences (March 1997: 17).
Within choice based theories these routine rules
are regarded as established in a conscious rational
process. To rule based theories the underlying
logic of decisions however is completely different,
and goes much further than routine decisions.
Within choice-based theories, the process of
weighing alternatives is based on values, i.e.
individual preferences over alternative outcomes.
Facts and values are often clearly separated.
Values come into play after the process of
information gathering. Prescriptive ethics tradi-
tionally focuses on this moment. The prevailing
notion is that ethics and the non-ethical language
that describes and explains situations and events
belong to separate domains. However, as will be
argued in the rest of this section, it is questionable
whether moral decisions determine behaviour,
especially for organizations. If they do not,
descriptive business ethics is not satisfactory
when studying only the moral part of decision-
making.
Values play a role in complex ways; so complex,
in fact, that we are, for the most part, unaware of
it. In that sense, systematic reﬂection on values
can determine only a small part of our behaviour.
When managers make decisions, all kinds of
(unconscious) values play a role, but so do many
other things. Klamer (2000: 2) writes:
Even the purchase of an ice-cream may involve a
negotiation among many different little and big
values. Because I like to follow my senses I might
indulge yet because I also value being healthy
I may refrain. Or I may have an agreement with
my partner to reduce my weight and so have to
factor the value of being trustworthy . . . And if
I have decided to enjoy myself that very moment,
will I care about whom to give my business? How
much do I value the values of a socially minded
and therefore high-cost company that I will pay
extra for its product? Do I care about the esthetics
of the place? Does it matter who the other
customers are? No algorithm will do justice to
the complicated process that constitutes the
purchase of an ice-cream.
Managers will almost never base decisions only on
what they perceive as explicit moral values or
arguments (Bird & Waters 1989). No one’s
actions are based on only conscious decisions
solely based on explicit moral values. Yet, many
values play a role in every decision, and many of
them are unreﬂected. Describing the moral side of
a company by describing the moral part of
managerial decision-making provides just a frag-
ment of the whole picture. Somehow, the business
context wherein managerial decisions are made
also contains important moral information (But-
terﬁeld et al. 2000). This is also what rule-based
decision theorists argue.
Managers have a hard time identifying the
ethical dimensions of their decisions in the ﬁrst
place. Donaldson & Dunfee state (1995: 87):
‘Managers are situated in a web of (sometimes)
conﬂicting loyalties and duties – some legal
Q2
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(contractual and otherwise) and others personal
(e.g., friendships, familial obligations, and so
forth)’. Part of the problem in most cases is the
problem of causality. Often the causality of a
situation of managers is so complex, that the
outcome of a (moral) choice cannot be known at
the moment of making a decision, making it very
hard to ‘know’ for managers what is the right
thing to do. Managers, as Jackall (1988: 12)
noticed, face series of intractable dilemmas that
often demand compromises with traditional mor-
al beliefs. Jackall (1988: 13):
The moral dilemmas posed by bureaucratic work
are, in fact, pervasive, taken for granted, and, at
the same time, regularly denied. Managers do,
however, continually assess their decisions, their
organizational milieux, and especially each other
to ascertain which moral rules-in-use apply in
given situations. Such assessments are always
complex and most often intuitive.
At the core of some theories in business ethics
(especially choice-based) that concentrate on
studying moral decisions is a methodological
individualism. Methodological individualism states
that behaviour of an organization is always
reducible to the behaviour of the individuals that
are members of the organization. As March &
Olsen (1989: 4) write, within such a perspective,
the behaviour of an organization is the conse-
quence of the interlocking choices by individuals
and subunits, each acting in terms of expectations
and preferences manifested at those levels. Out-
comes at the system level are thought to be
determined by the interactions of individuals
acting consistently in terms of individual beha-
viour, whatever they may be. Methodological
individualism is inclined to see moral phenomena
as the aggregate consequence of individual
behaviour. The world, in this view, is in large
part the outcome of choice. And in decision-
making, processes are viewed in terms of (com-
plex) interactions among elementary events or
actors.
Methodological individualism, however, has
often been criticized (March & Olsen 1989,
Bauman 1993); it simply does not explain many
social phenomena around organizations. The
impact of the consequences of our combined
actions can often not be traced back to individual
decisions. This leads to some problems for
business ethicists: routine decisions, all morally
acceptable from an individual standpoint, can
lead to disastrous outcomes. The world is not
shaped by conscious individual decisions; the
organizational world is not simply a sum of
individual decisions. Especially in the organiza-
tional world, individual (moral) decisions are, at
best, a tiny part of the whole picture. Bauman
(1993: 18) states: ‘Sin without sinners, crime
without criminals, guilt without culprits! Respon-
sibility for the outcome is, so to speak, ﬂoating,
nowhere ﬁnding its natural haven’.
Many good arguments about economic, natural
or social forces, for instance, can be presented to
argue that institutions (not in the sense of
organizations or buildings, more in a sense of
collective ways of thinking, feeling and doing)
determine, in large part, the decisions and
behaviour of people (e.g. Foucault 1977). There
are dynamics that transcend individuals and these
internal dynamics transcend individual behaviour
and decisions. What managers think, feel, intend
or want is not all-important because many supra-
individual causalities have to be taken into
account. Organizations have their own dynamics.
For descriptive ethics, it is therefore important
that we do not only focus on (moral) decisions by
individuals. To study moral managerial decisions,
the context is of crucial importance. Within the
body of work on managerial decision-making (e.g.
Shapira 1997), this has often been acknowledged
before (e.g. O’Connor 1997). Also, most business
ethicists seem to agree on the importance of
the business context within business ethics, both
for description and prescription. To give just one
example, Soule (2002: 116) states: ‘An adequate
moral strategy needs to be relevant to the context
of commercial life’. However, how the contested
concept of context should be understood turns
out be problematic. In the rest of this article,
causalities that transcend individuals are pro-
moted as the unit of analysis in empirical moral
research, namely discourse; discourse is used
to describe the context of managerial decision-
making. Discourse theory allows us to represent
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decision-making in considerable complexity: ‘It
takes seriously March’s suggestion to study
decision-making in the context of human life’
(O’Connor 1997: 318). Discourse analysis offers a
contextual perspective in which decisions are
made, a perspective that many managerial deci-
sion theories lack.
Language and morality
In past decades, discussions on the nature of truth
have profoundly affected social research. Instead
of assuming a given world ‘out there’, waiting to
be discovered, attention is being drawn to
processes and ways through which the world is
represented in language. The access we have to a
reality outside language is highly problematic.
Language does not simply report facts; it is not a
simple medium for the transport of meaning.
What is meant by, and the effect of, the words ‘I
want to do business with her’ depends entirely on
the context in which these words are spoken or
written. Du Gay (1996: 47) states:
The meaning that any object has at any given
time is a contingent, historical achievement . . .
theorists of discourse argue that the meaning of
objects is different from their mere existences, and
that people never confront objects as mere
existences, in a primal manner; rather these objects
are always articulated within particular discursive
contexts.
Perhaps it is the case, as some philosophers claim,
that what exists in the world is a necessity
(independent of human beings or language), but
things can only be differentiated through lan-
guage. The world itself does not give meaning to
objects; this is done through language. In other
words, although things might exist outside lan-
guage, they get their meanings through language.
This view of language implies the possibility of
describing the business context as a discursive
construction. The meaning of anything always
exists in particular discursive contexts; meaning is
always contextual, contingent and historical. For
business studies, language is not just seen as
reﬂective of what goes on in an organization.
Discourses and organizations are one and the
same. ‘That is, organizing becomes communicat-
ing through the intersection of discourse and text’
(Putnam 2000: 225). Our so-called ‘organizational
actions’ are embedded in discursive ﬁelds and are
only recognizable as practices through discourse.
Organizational discursive practices exist only in
the organizational surroundings and practices
they are part of.
There have been many interpretations of
discourse and discourse theory (see Alvesson &
Karreman 2000). In daily language, for example,
a discourse can be deﬁned as conversation. Within
the social sciences, the concept has a wider
meaning. In this article, a discourse is deﬁned as
‘a speciﬁc ensemble of ideas, concepts and
categorizations that are produced, reproduced
and transformed in a particular set of practices
and through which meaning is given to physical
and social realities’ (Hajer 1995: 44). For example,
psychiatric discourse brought the idea of an
unconscious into existence in the 19th century
(cf. Foucault 1977, Phillips & Hardy 2002: 3).
Discourses contain groups of statements that
provide a way of talking and thinking about
something, thereby giving meaning to social
reality. Discourses are not ‘out there’ between
reality and language; they are not just a group of
signs – they refer to practices that systematically
form the objects we speak of. Discourse is not just
a ‘way of seeing – a worldview – but is embedded
in social practices that reproduce the ‘way of
seeing’ as ‘truth’. Discourses are constitutive of
reality (de Graaf 2001). What is and is not true,
the things we discuss – these cannot be seen
outside discourse; they are internal to it. By
looking at what people say and write, we can learn
how their world is constructed. The concept of
discourse is often used to overcome oppositions
like ‘action and structure’ or ‘individual and
structure’. As discourses, as used here, institu-
tionalize the way of talking about something,
they produce knowledge and thereby shape
social practices. Social interactions cannot be
understood without the discourses that give
them meaning. Discourses function as a structure
to behaviour; they both enable and constrain
it.
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Over the last two decades, organization studies
have given much attention to language and
discourse. Putnam & Fairhurst (2001) give a good
overview of the developments in the area of
discourse theory in organization studies. Alvesson
& Karreman (2000) discuss the variety of ways
in which the concept of discourse is used in
organizations studies. For more on discourse
analyses, one could mention Dijk (1985) and
Titscher et al. (2000). Metaphors have been
studied extensively (e.g. Yanow 1992, Alvesson
1993, Palmer & Dunford 1996), as have concepts
such as trope (e.g. Skoldberg 1994), symbolism
(e.g. Morgan 1986) and narrative (e.g. Wilkins
1983, Deetz 1986, Boje 1991, O’Connor 1995,
2000, Czarniawska 1997, Dicke 2001).
The ﬁeld of business ethics, however, does not
pay much attention to (some form of) discourse
theory. Among the exceptions are Parker (1998)
and Shapiro (1992). Also, Cheney & Christensen
(2001) discuss corporate rhetoric (not internal
discourses, but communication that is directed to
outsiders of the organization) on corporate social
responsibility from a discursive perspective. De-
scriptive ethical research in the tradition of Jackall
(1988), Bird & Waters (1989) and Kunda (1992),
looks at what and how moral issues are an issue in
the daily life of managers. How do managers talk
about ethics and what moral issues do they
encounter? Furthermore, in the rare so-called
genealogical discourse analyses (Foucault 1977),
the role of power is central. Building on the work
of Foucault, some researchers (Clegg 1989) within
organization studies have shown how discourses,
with their inherent worldview, give some an
advantage over others, which has obvious moral
implications.
Like meaning, values are immanent features of
language. Language is not a neutral means of
communication, the use of language contains
normative commitments. When we give meaning
to something, we are also valuing it. Even though
a Durkheimian view is clearly not endorsed here
(with an emphasis here on language instead of
institutions), there is a parallel. To Durkheim
social institutions, collective ways of thinking,
feeling and doing are not empty but full of values
(values give meaning to relationships). In similar
fashion, discursive practices are not empty; they
are ﬁlled with values. By giving something a
name, we highlight certain aspects. But in that
same process, all other possible qualities are
placed in the background or even ignored. Values,
causal assumptions and problem perceptions
affect each other. In our daily lives, we jump so
often between normative and factual statements
that we do not realize how much our views of
facts determine whether we see problems in the
ﬁrst place. But when we study our discussions
more carefully, we can see that the ‘is’ and ‘ought’
are intertwined. Seemingly technical positions in
discourses conceal normative commitments. Dis-
courses make more than claims of reality – they
accomplish what Scho¨n & Rein (1994) have called
the ‘normative leap’ or the connection between a
representation of reality and its consequences for
action. Within most versions of discourse theory,
the strict dichotomy between facts and values
ceases to make sense. Facts and values here are
not treated as ontologically different; discourse
theory treats them as different sides of the same
coin. The ‘is’ and ‘ought’ shape each other in
countless ways. Language is thus neither neutral
nor static in communicating meaning. The aware-
ness that language does not neutrally describe the
world is important for business ethicists. Subtle
linguistic forms and associated symbolic actions
shape our convictions and presuppositions (Twist
1994: 79).
Discourses contain the conditions of possibility
of what can and cannot be said. The fact that a
moral question arises in business is as interesting
as what question is asked, as is the fact that many
moral questions are not asked. Every question
that is asked gets some form of an answer which
has consequences. Every (non-) decision of any
manager in any company is a social activity and
affects people’s lives (Hackley & Kitchen 1999:
23). In a speciﬁc discourse, different moral
questions are raised than in others. As soon as
managers of soccer clubs start to talk about soccer
as a ‘product’ (a relatively new development), a
new world opens up around the same old game
with new opportunities, managerial problems and
new moral issues (Hawkes 1998). Discourses do
not only help us understand that a certain moral
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question is asked, they also give us the spectrum
of possible solutions to moral problems being
raised, i.e. what is or is not seen as a viable
solution to a speciﬁc moral problem. It can be
suspected that the framing of moral questions by
managers (Scho¨n & Rein 1994), differs from
moral questions framed by professional ethicists.
Where moral philosophers frame moral questions
for managers based on their philosophical dis-
courses, managers (needing a ‘tractable morality’,
see de Graaf 2005) frame their moral questions on
a daily basis.
Although Aristotelians and pragmatics like
Dewey (1948) intensely consider deliberation and
conversation, there are clear differences with the
discourse theory as described above. Aristotelian
ethicists are usually looking for virtues to be
named, virtues that are good. Most discourse
theorists although, want to stay away from
anything associated with essentialism. Instead of
looking for virtues for individuals, discourse
theorists want to problematize the central role of
individuals (at least the central role of individuals
in research). Individuals are part of organizations;
they operate in discursive contexts that determine
(at least in great part) their behaviour. Discourses
thus focus more on context than on individuals
and their virtues. The extent to which individuals
are inﬂuenced by their contexts gives rise to
extensive discussions about their autonomy and
freedom. These discussions (interesting as they
are) are here left aside. What is important is that
the behaviour of individuals is, at least to a high
degree, inﬂuenced by the organizational entities in
which they work. And that affects the morality of
managers. Jackall (1988: 192) concludes:
. . . because moral choices are inextricably tied to
personal fates, bureaucracy erodes internal and even
external standards of morality not only in matters of
individual success and failure but in all the issues
that managers face in their daily work. Bureaucracy
makes its own internal rules and social context the
principal moral gauges for action . . . Within such
crucibles, managers are continually tested as they
continually test others. They turn to each other for
moral cues for behavior and come to fashion speciﬁc
situational moralities for speciﬁc signiﬁcant others in
their world.
Discourse analysis and descriptive
business ethics
An interesting additional method to traditional
ones of describing moral decisions of managers, is
looking at the way managers talk about and view
reality: describing their discourses. Instead of
looking at the moral agents or the organization
as a moral entity, one can study an organization’s
internal discourse. In that sense, individuals are
neither central to, nor the proposed objects of,
study (methodological individualism); the object
of study is discourses. By describing discourses of
managers, moral aspects come to the fore.
How does research with discourse theory work?
A researcher conducts discourse descriptions or
analyses, the basis of which are texts (the material
manifestation of discourses). All verbal and
written language can be considered. A discourse
analysis shows which discursive objects and
subjects emerge in social practices, and which
conceptualizations are used. Consequently, what
is left out in social practices also emerges. It is not
the purpose of discourse analysis to retrieve what
the authors exactly meant or felt when writing or
speaking, or what interests they had. Discourse
analysis is not a search for meaning, empirical or
otherwise, of texts. The analysis focuses on the
effects of the texts on other texts. They are
described by studying the language practices
among similar language practices. Hajer (1995:
54) states: ‘Discourse analysis investigates the
boundaries between . . . the moral and the
efﬁcient, or how a particular framing of the
discussion makes certain elements appear ﬁxed or
appropriate while other elements appear proble-
matic’.
A discourse analysis inquires into forms of
problematization and offers a narrative about
the production of problems. Why is something
considered a problem (or not)? It does not
concentrate on answering the problem at hand.
In other words, when doing a discourse analysis,
one can establish the limits of what can and
cannot be said in a particular context, what
Foucault (1977) called ‘the conditions of possibi-
lity’ of a discourse. A discourse analysis can
identify the rules and resources that set the
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boundaries of what can be said, thought and done
in a particular (organizational) context or situa-
tion. Mauws (2000: 235) states: ‘Thus, if we are to
comprehend how decisions are made . . . it is by
examining the conditions of possibility in relation
to which these statements are formulated, that is,
the often implicit institutionalized speech prac-
tices that guide what is and what is not likely to be
said (Bourdieu)’. By conducting discourse ana-
lyses in the ﬁeld of business ethics, the contex-
tuality of ethics is taken seriously. It gives content
to the vague notion of ‘putting moral problems
into context’ (Hoffmaster 1992: 1427).
Discourse descriptions do not only help us
understand that a certain moral question is asked,
they also give us the spectrum of possible
solutions to the moral problems being raised, i.e.
what is or is not seen as a viable solution to a
speciﬁc moral problem. A problem deﬁnition
inevitably predisposes certain solutions, and vice
versa (Wildavsky 1987, Rochefort & Cobb 1994,
Kingdon 1995, Eeten 1998: 6). Compare this with
the following quotation from Scho¨n & Rein
(1993: 153):
When participants . . . name and frame the . . .
situation in different ways, it is often difﬁcult to
discover what they are ﬁghting about. Someone
cannot simply say, for example, ‘Let us compare
different perspectives for dealing with poverty,’
because each framing of the issue of poverty is
likely to select and name different features of the
problematic situation. We are no longer able to say
that we are comparing different perspectives on
‘the same problem,’ because the problem itself has
changed.
Asking a (moral) question assumes knowing what
would constitute an answer to it.
Studying managerial decisions of bankers
In Holland the three largest banks dealing with
private businesses are ING, ABN-Amro and
Rabobank. Each of the three banks would argue
that they differ from each other. Rabobank, for
example, is a co-operative, not listed on any stock
exchange. Therefore it does not have to satisfy
shareholders and, according to Rabobank, this
means more than just a different legal way of
doing business. Rabobank claims that (partly)
because they do not have to make a proﬁt to
satisfy shareholders, they treat their clients
differently. And they claim to care more about
the local economy than their competitors do.
One of the many ways in which the three banks
could differ, are the decisions they make towards
requests for a loan by business start-ups. The
problem with a business start-up for banks is that
they pose a higher risk. Many new companies go
bankrupt in the ﬁrst year of their existence.
By understanding how bankers make their
choices with respect to start-ups, a discourse
description can render visible the discursive
formation within which bankers speak. It can
identify the rules about the limits of what can and
what cannot be said within a banker’s discourse.
A discourse analysis can ﬁrst of all try to make
clear how the banker sees himself, what his
identity is. Then it can try to show how the
identity of the banker is matched to a situation in
which a loan for a start-up is decided. It has good
opportunities to ﬁnd rules that managers apply
that are not ﬁnancial norms, and that the bankers
themselves are not consciously aware of. Maybe
the manager sees himself and his business as
something essential to the economic development
is his region, which could lead to favourable
impressions of business start-ups. Or maybe he is
young and trying to make a fast career within his
national bank organization, and is very concerned
with avoiding big ﬁnancial risks for his local
bank, because the national bank is judging him
very heavily on avoiding ‘mistakes’. This example
would lead to very stringent decision rules for
business start-ups. A discourse analysis could also
compare banks in that way. What are the
similarities and what are the differences between
the identities of local bank directors? Rabobank
claims that it pays much attention to the region a
speciﬁc bank ofﬁce is located in. Is that reﬂected
in the way the local bank directors talk about
start-ups and the decision process about whether
to give them a loan?
A discourse analysis by De Graaf (2001),3 a
study on bankers’ conceptualizations of their
customers, concluded that there are ﬁve different
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discourses about customers among Dutch bank-
ers. These discourses contain many aspects about
the job of a banker and conceptualizations of
their customers. The discourse descriptions give
valuable information about the context of man-
agerial decisions. It is shown how bankers in the
discourse of Rabobank make more favourable
decisions towards giving loans to business start-
ups: they use a discourse where helping to start a
business is seen as a moral question; others do
not. The latter will ask themselves moral ques-
tions about start-up company loans but look
primarily at the ﬁnancial risk, and ask themselves
primarily ﬁnancial questions.
As stated before, in discourses factual and
valuational statements are intertwined. Different
ways of looking at the factual world lead to
different valuations of it and vice-versa. The
moral problems managers have are always em-
bedded in a context. Morals are always situa-
tional. In talking about values, bank managers
from a discourse wherein the relationship with the
customer is a commercial one, immediately start
to talk about fraud and how to prevent it (de
Graaf 2001). Moral issues seen by bankers – the
treatment of start-ups, environmental issues,
using the bank to improve the region, dealing
with sponsor money, having a customer in
ﬁnancial difﬁculty, whether to treat clients differ-
ently, when to be completely honest to customers,
how to negotiate with customers, etc – are
indissolubly tied to factual images a banker has
of his customers. The moral questions and the
factual images are part of the same discourse. By
giving the best discourse description possible, the
differences in moral stances between discourses
become apparent by contrasting them.
Genealogical discourse analyses
Foucauldian genealogical studies are a special
form of discourse analysis. Within his so-called
archeology, Foucault (1970, 1972) looked for
speciﬁc forms of ‘problematization’, how the
subject and knowledge were connected. Within
archeology, by using a grammar in its descriptions
that replaces the subject with consciousness by a
subject as the receiver of social meaning, static
concepts are made ﬂuid in a historical process.
Within genealogy, Foucault(e.g. 1977) looked for
the way forms of problematizations are shaped by
other practices. Shapiro (1992: 29) states:
Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently
documentary. Committed to inquiry, it seeks
endlessly to dissolve the coherence of systems of
intelligibility that give individual and collective
identities to persons/peoples and to the orders that
house them by recreating the process of descent
within which subjectivities and objectivities are
produced.
The role of power is now central. There is
considerable power in structured ways of viewing
reality. Power is not deﬁned as a feature of an
institution or person but relationally. Building on
the work of Foucault, some researchers within
business studies have shown how discourses, with
their inherent worldview, give some an advantage
over others. See, for example, Clegg (1989).
As soon as the power concept comes in, it
should get the immediate attention of business
ethicists. To reveal the forces or power of a
discourse, genealogy has to go back to the
moment in which an interpretation or identity
became dominant within a discourse. Habermas
(1984) tried to improve conversation. Genealo-
gists, on the other hand, are suspicious of all
conversation because they recognize that systems
of intelligibility exist at the expense of alterna-
tives.
A genealogical discourse analysis within busi-
ness ethics can analyze how power and knowledge
function in discourse and organizations, how the
rules and resources that delineate the limits of
what can be said are working. Foucault (1977,
1984) has shown how power works through
‘subjectiﬁcation’. Every discourse claims to talk
about reality. In doing so, it classiﬁes what is true
and what is not, what is permitted and what is
not, what is desirable and what is not, and so on.
Truth and power are closely related. As Foucault
(1984: 74) stated: ‘Truth is linked in a circular
relation with systems of power which induce
and which extend it’: a ‘regime of truth’. Power
is not just repressive; it is always productive.
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A genealogical discourse analysis can reveal some
of the ways power functions and can thus add to
the understanding of the meaning of decisions in
organizations. It can follow back in history the
traces of a discourse and reveal the contingencies
of a current discourse.
Storylines and metaphors in
business ethics
Discursive practices are morally shaped in many
ways and discourse theory offers several possibi-
lities to study how. One is studying storylines and
metaphors in discursive practices. When one has a
certain worldview and uses a certain discourse,
one takes a position within discussions in terms of
the particular concepts, metaphors and stories of
that discourse. For business ethics, it is important
that a discourse analysis can show how forces in
language inﬂuence moral positions by looking at
the role metaphors and storylines play within a
discourse. Discourse analysis can also gain in-
sights into the structure, dynamics and directions
of conﬂicting discourses, like narrative strategies.
Stories play an important role in people’s lives;
in large part, they give meaning to them (Watson
1994). If you want to get to know someone, you
ask for a life story. Stories are about what is
important and what is not. Philosophers like
Johnson (1993) or McIntyre (1991) would go so
far as to argue that stories are central to creating
human understanding: ‘I can only answer the
question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the
prior question, ‘Of what story or stories do I ﬁnd
myself a part?’ ’ (O’Connor 1997: 304). Fisher
(1987: xiii) claims that ‘all forms of human
communication need to be seen fundamentally
as stories’. It is therefore not surprising that
stories are also important to studies of the
organization. Herbert Simon argued that stories
allow decision-making to take place. Many
scholars agree that stories contain much informa-
tion about an organization and are efﬁcient at
conveying information (Roe 1994: 9). Boje (1991:
106) argues: ‘People engage in a dynamic process
of incremental reﬁnement of their stories of new
events as well as ongoing reinterpretations of
culturally sacred story lines’. ‘In sum people do
not just tell stories, they tell stories to enact an
account of themselves and their community’ (Boje
1995: 1001).
The assumption in this article that meaning is
produced in linguistic form ﬁts well with exploring
stories. Stories are simply one type of linguistic
form. Stories are elements of a discourse with
certain characteristics. Stories are especially im-
portant for ethicists: they contain values (ideas
about good and bad, right and wrong); they are
about good and evil. Within stories, the ‘is’ and
‘ought’ are closely connected. Even if they seem to
give simple factual descriptions, an enormous
implicit normative power lies within narratives.
Hayden White (1980: 26) writes: ‘What else could
narrative closure exist of than the passage of one
moral order to another? . . . Where, in any
account of reality, narrativity is present, we can
be sure that morality or a moralizing impulse is
present too’. According to White, the events that
are actually recorded in the narrative appear ‘real’
precisely insofar as they belong to an order of
moral existence, just as they derive their meaning
from their placement in this order. It is because
the events described conduce to the establishment
of social order or fail to do so that they ﬁnd a
place in the narrative attesting to their reality
(Ettema & Glasser 1988: 10). Or, as Randels
(1998: 1299) put it, ‘Worldview narratives not
only describe particular understandings of busi-
ness, but have important normative considera-
tions. They are not merely stories, but construe
how we do, can, or should view the world, and
how business people and corporations act, can act
and should act’. A narrative analysis can therefore
shed light on how different moral positions relate
to each other. It shows how narrative structures
(partly) determine moral positions and identities,
and how they thereby inﬂuence the actions of
individuals and organizations; and how internal
dynamics of a discourse can inﬂuence the moral
position that is taken.
Scholars have pointed to the moral signiﬁcance
of metaphors in business studies and in many
empirical organizational discourse analyses, the
role of metaphors has been brought to the fore
(O’Connor 1995, 1997, 2000). Weick (1979: 50),
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for example, pointed to the operational conse-
quences of metaphor. Just like stories, metaphors
are important to business ethicists because of the
(often implicit) moral baggage they carry. De-
scribing metaphors in discursive practices can
bring clarity to how metaphors, in part, morally
shape discursive practices, i.e. how morality is
embedded in discursive practices.
The status of business ethics
When values are an integral part of any discourse,
they are an integral part of the business ethics
discourse. The thesis that meaning is constructed
by and through discourse has implications for the
notion of ethics itself. It is, as Hackley (1999: 38)
notes, ‘inseparable from ways of talking about
and doing ethics and ethical things’. The descrip-
tive ethics of the researcher comprises a moral
component; descriptive ethics contains values
itself and does not just mirror reality (cf. Willmott
1998: 80). Business ethicists’ studies play a role in
what Foucault called ‘the regime of truth’.
It was often concluded in business studies
literature that ‘independence’ and ‘accountability’
of employees were good for a company in a
business sense. At the same time, business ethicists
concluded they were good in a moral sense.
Within companies, it is important who speaks of
morals, what their viewpoints are and whose
interests are represented. In a nutshell, how is
ethics turned into a discourse? How do the forms
of problematization of managers ﬁt with forms of
problematization of business ethics? The Foul-
cauldian question becomes: to what extent is
business ethics used as a power tool to discipline
workers? This is what Bauman argues too. He
accuses organizations (bureaucracies) in our
society of ‘instrumentalising’ ethics to achieve
the goals of the organization rather than ethics
being the systematic reﬂection of the goals of the
organization. When opinion within a manage-
ment discourse is that employees steal too much
from the company, they can hire ‘integrity
consultants’. These consultants do not evaluate
the goals or the products of the organization, nor
do they look at whether employees are treated
kindly. Instead, they are used to discipline
employees with the use of an ethical discourse.
Conclusion
When managerial decisions are examined, some-
how the business context must be included in the
analysis. First in this article, problems with
choice-based theories of managerial decisions
were discussed. Also, methodological individual-
ism turned out to be problematic. In this article,
causalities that transcend individuals were the
proposed unit of analysis in empirical moral
research, namely discourse. After discussing dis-
course theory, the conclusion is that (the different
forms of) discourse theory can help studying
managerial decisions in many ways. It was shown
here what a discourse analysis within business
ethics could look like. Special attention was paid
to genealogical studies, stories and metaphors.
Here, both language and the subject are
proposed to be treated as contingents instead of
looking for essential, deep criteria or fundamen-
tals. Starting from the assumption that the ‘world
out there’ is constructed by discursive conceptions
and that they are collectively sustained and
continually renegotiated in the process of making
sense (cf. Parker 1992: 3). The role of language in
constituting reality was seen as central. It is
through discourses that we view and value things.
Therefore, the speciﬁc discourse a manager is in
has many consequences. When we describe how
bank managers talk about their customers, the
description says a lot how the banker treats
customers. In the same profession, managers treat
clients differently. This is interesting for clients,
managers and, not least, business ethicists.
Notes
1. As will become clear, a purely non-normative
description is never possible.
2. Utilitarianism is often used, for example, in cost-
beneﬁt analyses. It ‘is a powerful theory that
certainly ﬁts in well with our moral intuitions,
particularly within the context of the business
community’ (Kaptein & Wempe 2002: 74). Bob
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Solomon applied ‘virtue ethics’ to business ethics
(Solomon 1992). Solomon came up with four basic
virtues for companies: honesty, fairness, trust and
toughness. Scholars who use some sort of integrity
approach, such as Kaptein & Wempe (2002),
usually try to ﬁnd the right mix between the three
classic moral theories. Scholars like Ronald Green
(1994) take a more deontological approach: they
deﬁne clear moral guidelines and principles to which
companies always have to adhere. A theorist like
Freeman, with a ‘fair contracts’ approach, reﬂects
the assumptions and methodology of the modern
liberal Rawlsian theory of justice and property
rights (Sorell 1998: 26). The stakeholder approach,
like the one by Donaldson and Preston, has some
afﬁnities with utilitarian notions. Like the utilitarian
moral theorists, stakeholder theorists struggle with
the following problems: whom to identify as morally
relevant? How to accommodate conﬂicting inter-
ests? And what to do with moral claims that are
incomparable? Answers should lead to a situation
that is best for all. Contract theorists, such as
Donaldson & Dunfee (2000), do not so much get
their inspiration from the classic moral theories, but
make use of other classic philosophers like Hobbes,
Locke and Rousseau.
3. In this case, Q-methodology was used as the
research method. However, other methods like
narrative analysis or ethnography could be used as
well for discourse analysis (cf. de Graaf 2005).
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